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Abstract
This paper proposes a generalization of Shleifer’s (1985) model of yardstick competition,
to a dynamic framework. Specifically, we consider a differential game and we show that
the yardstick mechanism is effective to replicate the first-best solution if players adopt
open-loop behaviour rules and they are symmetric at the initial time; in the absence of
initial symmetry, the social efficiency is reached only in the asymptotic steady state. On
the contrary, if players adopt Markovian behaviour rules, then the yardstick pricing rule
is not able to achieve the first-best solution along the equilibrium path of any Markov
Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
Yardstick regulation is a price regulation scheme, originally presented in a theoretical
model by Shleifer (1985), according to which the regulated price set for a given firm is
obtained from the cost structure of similar firms. This mechanism is implemented, in some
countries, to regulate prices in the sectors of healthcare, transport, energy and, more in
general, in public utilities and services (see, e.g., Schmalensee and Willig, 1989, Part 5,
and Armstrong and Porter, 2007),1 with two main aims: to avoid market failures due to
the asymmetric information between regulated firms and the regulator, and to provide
incentives for driving less efficient firms to improve their efficiency.
Despite the fact that yardstick regulation mechanism was proposed precisely to reach
the goal of leading firms to improve their efficiency over time, no simple, dynamic versions
of the model are available in the literature, to the best of our knowledge. By ‘dynamic
version’ we mean a model where a pricing rule for every instant over the time period under
consideration is obtained, and it is possible to evaluate the dynamic path of the relevant
variables, namely, on the one hand, the cost-reducing investments and the corresponding
cost levels of regulated firms, and, on the other hand, the regulated prices and the demand
levels. We aim to fill this gap, by presenting a differential game model where yardstick
competition can be introduced. We study the features of such a regulation mechanism,
and specifically we assess whether the repetition of the yardstick pricing rule derived by
Shleifer (1985) leads to the first-best outcome also in a dynamic game framework.
Our paper is thus related to two strands of the literature. On the one hand, on the
technical side, our work is close to previous contributions dealing with dynamic regulation
in a differential game framework. For instance, in the field of environmental economics,
Benchekroun and Long (1998) propose a mechanism of efficiency-inducing tax or subsidy
to correct the production choices of polluting oligopolists, while Menezes and Pereira
(2017) consider also R&D activities, and determine the optimal mix of emissions tax and
1See also Meran and von Hirshhausen (2009), who point out that the mechanism is not as widely used
as its proponents may have expected.
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R&D subsidy; in the field of resource economics, Akao (2008) and Bisceglia (2019) deal
with the optimal taxation of common-pool resources. On the other hand, we contribute
to a rather limited literature concerning dynamic aspects of yardstick regulation. Specif-
ically, a generalization of the static Shleifer’s model is proposed by Faure-Grimaud and
Reiche (2006), who explicitly deal with dynamic yardstick mechanisms, with a focus on
mechanism design in the presence of private information. The importance of considering
truly dynamic models, to assess the properties of yardstick competition, is also supported
by the theoretical considerations offered by Meya (2015), who observes that real life ap-
plication of yardstick regulation often resorts to historical cost data, and argues that a
firm under yardstick regulation is able to affect the price it will be allowed to charge in
future if it can influence the current behaviour of competitors.
Differently from these contributions, which consider a finitely (Faure-Grimaud and
Reiche, 2006) or infinitely (Meya, 2015) repeated stage-game, in our model firms take
decisions concerning cost-reducing investments at any instant of continuous time. The
type of interaction among firms depends on the assumptions concerning the information
set available to firms at any point in time. As usual in differential games (see, e.g.,
Dockner et al., 2000), we will distinguish the case in which firms set their plans at the
beginning of the game, and then stick to them forever (open-loop solution) from the case
in which the state of the world is observable in any instant of time, and the firms find the
optimal rule connecting the choice variable to the state variables (closed-loop solution).
In particular, as far as the latter concept is concerned, we will consider Markovian state-
feedback closed-loop behaviour rules, in which the players’ choice variables are linked to
the current value of the state variable(s) only, and the rules are stable over time.
The consideration of a model in continuous time requires a specification concerning
the way in which we set up yardstick regulation, as compared to the static framework: in
Shleifer (1985), the regulator announces (and commits to) a pricing rule; then firms make
their (one-shot) decision, and the regulator’s rule is implemented. In our dynamic setting,
the rule has to be interpreted as announced at the outset of the game (i.e., at time 0);
then firms make their decisions over time, and in any instant the rule is implemented.
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Following the literature (see, e.g., Karp and Livernois, 1992), we argue that the reg-
ulator cannot commit to time dependent pricing rules, and we show that, even in the
absence of information asymmetries between the firms and the regulator, the social first-
best cannot be implemented if the regulator faces the dynamic price regulation problem of
each firm separately — i.e., she links the regulated price of each firm to its own cost only.
Starting from this impossibility result, we then turn to consider pricing rules entailing
yardstick competition among the regulated firms.
Our model will show that the yardstick regulation rule, as designed in the static
framework by Shleifer, is able to replicate the social optimum in the dynamic framework,
only if firms adopt open-loop behaviour rules. Indeed, if regulated firms are asymmetric,
as far as their initial costs are concerned, the replication of the first-best is limited to
the asymptotic steady state situation only. On the contrary, if firms are symmetric, the
replication of the social first-best occurs also along the whole equilibrium path leading to
the steady state. The yardstick regulation fails to replicate the first-best outcome if firms
adopt Markovian behaviour rules. This is due to the fact that, in the absence of regulation,
firms are able to react instant by instant to the dynamic evolution of state variables
(namely the cost levels of each firm), under the closed-loop behaviour rule, controlling
two choice variables (namely prices and cost reducing investments), whereas the regulator
can control only one policy instrument (i.e., the regulated price). Nevertheless, also in
the game with state-feedback information structure, regulated prices inducing yardstick
competition are likely to at least alleviate the static and dynamic inefficiencies which
would arise in the absence of regulation — i.e., if each monopolistic firm could freely set
its prices.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basics of the model.
Section 3 and 4 provide the social first-best solution and the optimal solution for a profit-
oriented monopolist, respectively. Section 5 deals with preliminary and general aspects
concerning price regulation in a dynamic environment. Section 6 studies the features of
the yardstick regulation mechanism. Conclusions are in Section 7.
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2. The model set-up
Like in Shleifer (1985), we consider a set of N identical firms, each of whom is serving
its niche, by selling one product at a price p. The niche demand, denoted by q(p),
must satisfy some standard assumptions. Specifically, we assume that q(·) ≥ 0 is twice
continuously differentiable, with q′(·) < 0 for all p ≥ 0, and the condition lim
p→∞
q(p) = 0
holds.
As for the technology, we consider constant marginal costs, denoted by c(), whose
amount depend on a variable , representing the efficiency level. Setting, without loss of
generality, fixed costs equal to zero, the marginal cost coincides with the average, or unit,
cost. Specifically, we assume that the unit cost function c(·) ≥ 0 is twice continuously
differentiable, with c′(·) < 0 and c′′(·) > 0 for all  ≥ 0, and lim
→∞
c() = c > 0: a more
efficient firm faces lower costs, and the marginal effect of the efficiency level on costs is
decreasing.2
In every instant of time, firms can make investment I aimed at increasing technological
efficiency, that is, at reducing the unit cost. Investment I entails a cost Γ(I) , γ
2
I2, γ > 0.
The instantaneous profit function for each firm is thus
pi(t) , [p(t)− c((t))]q(p(t))− γ
2
I2(t).
The efficiency level moves over time according to the following rule, which is clearly
inspired by the simple and widely used rule concerning the evolution of the capital stock
and investment (see, e.g., Dockner et al., 2000):
˙(t) = −δ(t) + θI(t), (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a depreciation rate and θ > 0 measures the investments’ effectiveness,
with an initial value (0) , 0 > 0.
Following Shleifer (1985), a transfer amount T , covered by a lump-sum tax, may be
2Lastly, we consider the following technical assumption: lim
→0
[c′()]3
c′′()
6= 0, which is satisfied by many
commonly used cost functions (see Example 1).
5
designed, to cover eventual firms’ losses. However, since T has only re-distributive effects,
it is immaterial to the first-best allocation.
We consider a model with infinite time horizon and we assume that all firms discount
future profits at a constant instantaneous rate r > 0. For simplicity, and in line with a
large body of literature, we consider the same discount rate also for the regulator.
Finally, together with the requirements imposed on the cost and the demand functions,
throughout the paper, in order to have concave maximization problems, we impose the
following Assumption.
Assumption (A) [c′()q′(p)]2 + [q′(p) + (p− c())q′′(p)]c′′()q(p) < 0.
This assumption is satisfied by several commonly used demand and cost functions, at
least under some restrictions, as it is shown in the following example.
Example 1. Consider the linear demand q(p) , a−bp, with a, b > 0, and the exponential
cost function c() , e−k + c, with k > 0. Then, it is easy to see that Assumption (A) can
be written as: a− b > be−k. Accordingly, for p = c() (which turns out to be the case in
the social optimum), Assumption (A) is always satisfied for b < a
2+c
. Analogously, when
the price is set by an unregulated monopolist, it is always satisfied for b < a
3+c
.3 This
example suggests that Assumption (A) simply amounts to impose an upper bound on the
demand elasticity.
In the next two Sections, we consider two benchmark cases. We first examine the social
planner problem — i.e., we find the optimal price and investments set by a benevolent
planner who maximizes social welfare. Secondly, we consider the dynamic optimization
problem faced by an unregulated, profit-oriented, firm.
3. The first-best solution
As in Shleifer’s (1985) seminal (static) paper, we define the social welfare function for
each market niche, at any instant t, as the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the firm’s
3To see this, notice that the considered assumption is satisfied when the first-best and the monopoly
pricing rules are implemented for ek(a− bc) > 2b and ek(a− bc) > 3b, respectively.
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profit — i.e.,
w(t) ,
∫ ∞
p(t)
q(x)dx+ pi(t).
Notice that we do not attach any opportunity cost to public expenditure, if lump-sum
transfers are due, to lead firms to break-even. Extending the problem to a dynamic
framework, the benevolent planner faces the following optimal control problem
max
p(·)≥0,I(·)≥0
∫ ∞
0
e−rtw(t) dt
˙(t) = −δ(t) + θI(t), (0) , 0 > 0
whose solution is shown in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. In the first-best solution, for every t ∈ [0,∞):
p = c(),
and the time paths of the investments and the efficiency level solve the ODE system
I˙ = (r + δ)I + θ
γ
q(p)|p=c()c′()
˙ = −δ+ θI
(2)
The efficiency level in steady state ∗ is the unique positive solution of
γδ(r + δ)
θ2
∗ = −c′(∗)q(p)|p=c(∗), (3)
and it constitutes a saddle point.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Clearly, the benevolent planner sets the social first-best (i.e., the perfect competition)
prices over time. The corresponding demand levels impact on the optimal amount of
cost-reducing investments, which in turn affects future costs, hence prices, and so on.
Specifically, by drawing the nullclines in the state-control plane, it can be easily checked
that the transition to the steady state along the stable manifold is as follows: if 0 <
∗, then the social planner sets a high initial investment level I(0) > I∗ , δ
θ
∗; over
time, socially optimal investments’ levels are decreasing, nevertheless the efficiency levels
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increase up to the steady state value, hence price decreases over time. Clearly, the opposite
holds true if 0 > 
∗. This is not surprising, and the economic intuition behind the
converging process is linked to decreasing marginal returns of investments.
Finally, it is easy to see that the steady state value ∗ is a decreasing function of the
depreciation rate δ and the investments’ costs (measured by the parameter γ), whereas
it is an increasing function of the investments’ effectiveness (captured by the parameter
θ). Also these outcomes are far from being surprising, and they are in line with our
assumptions, which define a well-behaved technology.
4. The unregulated firm
Each unregulated firm aims to maximize the discounted profit flow by choosing prices
and cost-reducing investments over time, subject to the dynamic of the efficiency level,
given by the ODE (1). The solution of this optimal control problem is shown in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 2. The unregulated firm, for every t ∈ [0,∞), chooses p such that
q(p) + [p− c()]q′(p) = 0, (4)
and the time paths of the investments and the efficiency level solve the ODE system
I˙ = (r + δ)I + θ
γ
q(p)c′()
˙ = −δ+ θI
(5)
Let p = h() be the implicit function defined by the firm’s pricing rule4 (4). Then, the
efficiency level in steady state is the unique positive root ¯ of the algebraic equation
γδ(r + δ)
θ2
¯ = −q(p)|p=h(¯)c′(¯), (6)
and it constitutes a saddle point. Moreover, ¯ < ∗.
4This implicit function is defined for all  s.t. 2q′(p) + [p − c()]q′′(p) 6= 0, which is always satisfied
under Assumption (A).
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Notice that the difference between the investments’ time paths chosen by an unreg-
ulated firm and the benevolent planner is entirely driven by the different implemented
pricing rules — i.e., the monopoly price vs the perfect competition one. As a conse-
quence, the presence of market power results in higher steady state costs compared to the
social optimum.5 Thus, in steady state, the social planner sets the perfect competition
price, which is given by the cost c(∗), whereas the unregulated firm adds the monopolist
mark-up to its cost c(¯) > c(∗). The intuition is rather simple: other things being equal,
the individual optimum, like in a static framework, is characterized by a lower quantity
and a higher price as compared to the social optimum; hence, from the perspective of the
dynamic problem, the incentive to invest over time for reducing the unit cost is lower. Put
it in another way, our model suggests that, besides the static deadweight loss, a monopoly
also entails dynamic inefficiencies, due to the weaker incentives to reduce unit production
cost.
Thus, market regulation is needed to correct the above mentioned (static and dynamic)
inefficiencies. In the remainder of the paper, we deal with this optimal dynamic price
regulation problem.
5. Price regulation: preliminaries
To begin with, a few preliminary remarks about the dynamic price regulation problem
under consideration are in order. First, if the regulator (the benevolent social planner)
knows a firm’s technology, in principle, she could easily solve her problem by setting at
any time t a regulated price given by the first-best cost at time t, so to lead the firm
to replicate the social first-best investments’ choices. However, in our dynamic setting,
even under complete information, the above mentioned solution cannot be implemented
if the regulator has limited commitment power — i.e., she cannot commit at the outset of
5It is just the case to notice that the dynamic relationship between investments and efficiency levels
along the stable manifold as well as the comparative statics of ¯ with respect to the parameters δ, θ and
γ are, for obvious reasons, exactly as in the first-best solution.
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the game to the entire time path of prices {p(t)}t∈[0,∞). Indeed, for several reasons, the
assumption of full commitment is hardly in touch with reality. It is much more realistic
to assume that the regulator can commit to the implementation of a simple pricing rule,
which specifies the regulated price depending on the current value of the state variable.
Our restriction can be justified based on two kinds of consideration. On the one
hand, the yardstick pricing rule, as implemented in the real world, can be seen as a
Markov pricing rule (see, e.g., Meya, 2015).6 On the other hand, regulation in the form
of Markov policies has been widely employed in the differential game literature (see,
e.g., Benchekroun and Long, 1998), mainly for two reasons. On the technical side, this
choice is made for the sake of tractability, since it allows to restrict attention to Markovian
(state-feedback) Nash equilibria, which are much easier to characterize and interpret than
non-Markovian equilibria. From a game-theoretic perspective, non-Markovian policies,
which (explicitly) depend on time, are often vulnerable to strategic manipulation by the
regulated firm (see, e.g., Karp and Livernois, 1992).
Thus, in the remainder of the present analysis, as the solution concept to the outlined
dynamic price regulation problem, we consider first-best Markov pricing rules, defined as
follows.
Definition 1. A first-best Markov pricing rule is a function ρ() : R+ → R+ such that: (i)
the investments’ time path of the regulated firm solves system (2) and leads to steady state
defined by (3), and (ii) the price is at the perfect competition level for every t ∈ [0,∞).
To solve our dynamic price regulation problem we must first consider a regulated
firm’s behavior in response to a generic Markov pricing rule announced by the regulator,
and then look for a Markov pricing rule such that the firm’s behavior yields the first-best
solution — i.e., the two conditions stated in Definition 1 are fulfilled.
To begin with, notice that, for any given Markov pricing rule ρ() announced by the
6Clearly, in the real world, there is a (finite) time lag between the time in which the costs of regulated
firms are measured and the time in which regulated prices, based on those costs’ values, are implemented.
A discrete time set-up, such as in Meya (2015), is able to capture this time lag in a tractable way.
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public authority, a regulated firm’s profit, at any time t, is
pi(t) , [ρ((t))− c((t))]q(p)|p=ρ((t)) − γ
2
I2(t).
Hence, the firm chooses the investments’ time path to maximize its discounted profit flow,
subject to the dynamic constraint (1).
Notice that a pricing regulation rule ρ() does not implement yardstick competition
among the regulated firms, since it links the regulated price for a firm with the cost of the
firm itself: in other words, for the time being, we are assuming that the regulator aims
to solve the price regulation problem of each firm separately. It is just the case to notice
that a regulated price ρ() , c() (i.e., a cost reimbursement mechanism), would result
in nil investments over time, since the regulated firm could not increase its revenues by
investing in cost-reducing activities, while it would bear the costs of such investments.
By applying the Pontryagin maximum principle, it is easy to find that the investments’
and efficiency levels over time of a regulated firm solve the following ODE:
I˙ = (r + δ)I +
θ
γ
[
q(p)|p=ρ()c′()− ∂ρ
∂
[q(p)|p=ρ() + q′(p)|p=ρ()(ρ()− c())]
]
, (7)
coupled with the state equation (1). Next, assume that there exists a Markov pricing rule
ρ() such that, for some instant t ≥ 0, up to time t, the prices and the investments of
the regulated firm coincide with the corresponding first-best levels. Then, the investment
level at time t+ dt will coincide with the first-best one if and only if the right-hand side
of equation (7) coincides with the right-hand side of the corresponding ODE in system
(2). Since, by assumption ρ((t)) = c((t)),7 we have
q(p)|p=c((t))c′((t)) = q(p)|p=c((t))c′((t))− ρ′((t))q(p)|p=c((t)) ⇐⇒ ρ′((t)) = 0.
On the contrary, the price level at time t+ dt will coincide with the first-best one if and
only if, at  = (t), the time derivative of price and cost levels coincide with each other
7Clearly, with this notation we do not mean that the pricing rule consists in a cost-reimbursement
mechanism (ρ() , c()), but that it is specified in such a way that, given a specific value of the efficiency
level at time t, the price function computed at  = (t) yields c((t)).
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— i.e.,
d
dt
ρ((t)) =
d
dt
c((t)) ⇐⇒ ρ′((t))˙(t) = c′((t))˙(t),
which, off steady state (i.e., when ˙(t) 6= 0), implies
ρ′((t)) = c′((t)) < 0.
Therefore, we conclude that there does not exist a price function which simultaneously
satisfies both requirements (i) and (ii) of Definition 1.
Lemma 1. If the regulator considers the price regulation problem of each firm separately,
then there does not exist a first-best Markov pricing rule.
Intuitively, a reason why the impossibility emerges rests on the fact that the regulator
has one instrument (i.e., the regulated price), while private firms set a larger number of
control variables, namely prices and cost-reducing investments.
As a consequence of this impossibility result, we wonder whether a dynamic price reg-
ulation based on yardstick pricing rules (which will be defined in the following Section)
may be effective in driving firms to replicate the social first-best allocation. Thus, differ-
ently from the static model (Shleifer, 1985), in which the need for yardstick competition
mechanism rests on the fact that the regulator cannot observe the firms’ technology, here,
in a dynamic setting, there can be scope for introducing yardstick competition among the
regulated firms even tough there is no asymmetry of information between the regulator
and the firms, provided that the former cannot commit to time-dependent pricing rules.
This point can provide an additional rationale for the use of yardstick regulation mecha-
nism, beyond asymmetric information (or even in the case with symmetric information):
a regulation mechanism linking the price for a firm to a state variable (moving over time)
pertaining to the same firm, at least in the form of a Markov rule, is never able to replicate
the first-best outcome.
6. Yardstick Pricing Rules
In this Section, we investigate whether the possibility of introducing yardstick com-
petition among the regulated firms can lead the regulator to overcome the impossibility
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result shown in Lemma 1 — i.e., to achieve the first-best solution in all regulated markets.
Specifically, as in Shleifer (1985), for simplicity, we consider the same demand function
q(·) for each regulated firm i = 1, . . . , N . Furthermore, as far as technology is concerned,
we consider the same cost functions c(·) and Γ(·) for each firm, even tough we may allow
for different initial efficiency levels i(0) , i0 > 0.
Generalizing Shleifer (1985), a pricing rule entailing yardstick competition among the
regulated firms is a vector function ρ : RN → RN , whose i−th component ρi gives the
regulated price for firm i as a function of the efficiency levels of all regulated firms —
i.e., of the vector  , (i, −i), where −i , (1, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , N). Clearly, yardstick
pricing rules are, by definition, Markov pricing rules. The regulator aims to design a first-
best pricing rule, which is now defined as a yardstick pricing rule such that conditions (i)
and (ii) stated in Definition 1 hold true, along the equilibrium path of the game (more
below), for every regulated firm.
As in the previous Section, the first step of the analysis consists in determining the
regulated firms’ strategies in response to any given yardstick pricing rule ρ, announced at
the outset of the game and implemented at any instant of time. Each firm i = 1, . . . , N
faces the following optimal control problem:
max
Ii(·)≥0
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
[ρi()− c(i)]q(p)|p=ρi() −
γ
2
I2i
]
dt
˙j(t) = −δj(t) + θIj(t), j(0) , j0 > 0, j = 1, . . . , N
Thus, when the regulated price is specified as a yardstick pricing rule, the optimization
problems faced by each firm are no longer independent from each other. Put it another
way, such pricing scheme introduces dynamic strategic interdependencies among the regu-
lated firms, entailing that the analysis must be conducted in a differential game framework.
It is well known (see, e.g., Bas¸ar and Olsder, 1999) that, in this class of games, different
kind of strategies, hence equilibrium concepts, are defined, depending on the information
structure of the game — i.e., roughly speaking, the information on which each player
can base his action at each time instant. Accordingly, in the next Subsections, we deal
with the yardstick regulation problem by distinguishing between two different equilibrium
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concepts of the game, namely the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the Markov perfect
Nash equilibrium.
6.1. Open Loop Nash Equilibrium
In this Subsection, we focus on the Open Loop Nash Equilibrium (OLNE) of the game,
which is the equilibrium emerging in the case in which each player adopts an open-loop
behaviour rule — i.e., he decides at the beginning of the game (in t = 0) the course of his
own action, in order to maximize his individual objective function, and then sticks to it
forever. Hence, the optimal value of the control variable of each player over time depends
on the initial conditions and time t, but it does not depend on the state variables. The
open-loop behaviour rule is particularly appropriate and realistic when players cannot
observe the evolution of state variables over time, or when they have to set their plan at
the beginning of the time period under consideration and then they have to commit to it,
or even when it is difficult to adjust the control variable instant-by-instant to the current
value of the state variables. It is not very easy to provide concrete examples. However,
it can be argued that open-loop behaviour rules are appropriate when long-term, non
flexible, courses of actions are required, such as investment plans (see Cellini et al., 2018,
and Bisceglia et al., 2019, for real world instances in the healthcare sector).
For any given yardstick pricing rule announced by the regulator, the OLNE of the
differential game played by the regulated firms is shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Let ρ() be the pricing rule announced by the public authority. Then, the
ODE system in the state-control variables that the OLNE (I1(t), . . . IN(t)) solves is
I˙i = (r + δ)Ii +
θ
γ
[
q(p)|p=ρi()c′(i)− ∂ρi∂i [q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))]
]
˙i = −δi + θIi
(8)
The feedback representation of the investment dynamics under the OLNE is given by an
N-tuple (ψ1(), . . . , ψN()) which solves the following PDE system:〈
∂ψi
∂
,−δ+ θψi()
〉
= (r + δ)ψi()+
14
+
θ
γ
[
−∂ρi
∂i
[q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))] + c′(i)q(p)|p=ρi()
]
. (9)
Proof. See Appendix C.
We are now ready to investigate whether the yardstick pricing rule provided by Shleifer
(1985) leads to the first-best solution if it is adopted in the considered dynamic regulation
problem.
Recall that the Shleifer’s pricing rule is
ρi() ,
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
c(j). (10)
The regulated price for each firm i is thus the average of the unit cost of the other (similar)
regulated firms.
From (8), it follows that, when the Shleifer’s rule is employed, the OLNE strategy of
firm i solves:
I˙i = (r + δ)Ii +
θ
γ
c′(i)q(p)|p= 1
N−1
∑
j 6=i c(j)
.
Since the considered pricing rule is symmetric across the firms, the symmetrical structure
of the game implies that, when the initial cost is the same for all firms, then the equilibrium
investments’ time paths, and hence the costs’ levels over time, are the same for every
regulated firm under consideration — i.e., along the equilibrium path of the game,
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
c(j) = c(i), (11)
from which it can be easily verified that condition (i) of Definition 1 is fulfilled for each
firm i = 1, . . . , N . Moreover, from (11) it also follows that the price levels coincide with
the first-best ones over time — i.e., also condition (ii) of Definition 1 holds true, for every
regulated firm.
On the contrary, when the initial costs are different across the firms, clearly equation
(11) does not hold. However, denoting by ˜i the efficiency level in steady state for firm
i = 1, . . . , N , we have Ii(˜i) =
δ
θ
˜i and
δγ(r + δ)
θ2
˜i = −c′(˜i)q(p)|p= 1
N−1
∑
j 6=i c(j)
.
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Since the equations of the considered algebraic system are symmetric, the system admits
the symmetric solution ˜1 = . . . = ˜N , ˜, and it is easy to see that ˜ = ∗. We can thus
state what follows.
Proposition 3. Let i0 , 0 > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N . Then, along the equilibrium path of
the OLNE, the yardstick pricing rule (10) achieves the first-best solution. If, instead, the
initial efficiency levels are different, then the considered pricing rule leads to the first-best
outcome only in steady state.
With symmetric firms, the Shleifer’s pricing rule constitutes an optimal pricing rule
in our dynamic setting, provided that the regulated firms adopt open-loop strategies. In
other words, the result obtained by Shleifer (1985), according to which yardstick regulation
is able to replicate the social first-best, also applies (at least as far as the asymptotic
steady state is concerned) to a dynamic context in which firms commit to a plan, set at
the beginning of the game, and strategic interaction does not take place in every instant of
time. In the next Subsection we will show that this outcome does not extend to a dynamic
framework in which the strategic interaction leads firms to set their choices instant by
instant, following the evolution of the state of the world.
6.2. State-feedback Nash Equilibria
We now consider Markov perfect (state-feedback) Nash Equilibria (MPNE), in which
the strategy of each player depends only on the current value of the state variables: thus,
such an equilibrium concept is appropriate if players in each instant observe and take
into account the current value of states, which summarizes the whole past history of the
game. The strategies under consideration are labelled as state-feedback by Bas¸ar et al
(2018). They are a particular case of closed-loop rules (in which the control variables
depend on the state variables). State-feedback rules are said to be Markovian (and the
corresponding equilibrium concept is called Markov perfect) if the functional form of the
rules linking control(s) to state(s) remain stable over time. Of course, non-Markovian
rules (in which the link between the choice variable and the state is not stable over time)
or even more general closed-loop rules (in which past values of the state variables, along
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with the current ones, determine the choice variable) could be considered. However, the
corresponding equilibria are usually multiple or indeterminate. Thus, in line with the
available literature, we focus on Markovian state-feedback closed-loop solutions, which
are relatively simple to find and to interpret (see, e.g., Bas¸ar and Olsder, 1999, and
Dockner et al., 2000).
For the sake of tractability, and without loss of insights, we consider the simplest case
with N = 2 firms and, in order to restrict our attention to symmetric MPNE, constituted
by a pair of Markovian strategies (φ1(1, 2), φ2(1, 2)) such that ∀1, 2 : φ1(1, 2) =
φ2(2, 1), we consider a symmetric pricing rule such that ∀1, 2 : ρ1(1, 2) = ρ2(2, 1) ,
ρ(i, j). This assumption appears to be appropriate, as long as it does not entail any
bias or discrimination among firms (see, e.g., also Benchekroun and Long, 1998), and in
addition, the yardstick pricing rule (10) satisfies this property.
For any given yardstick pricing rule announced by the regulator, we can state what
follows.
Lemma 3. Let ρ(i, j) be the non-discriminatory pricing rule announced by the pub-
lic authority. Then, in any symmetric MPNE (φi, φj), with φi(i, j) = φj(j, i), the
equilibrium strategy solves the following PDE:
∂φi
∂i
(−δi + θφi) + ∂φi
∂j
(−δj + θφj) = (r + δ)φi + θ
γ
c′(i)q(p)|p=ρ(i,j)+
− θ
γ
[q(p)|p=ρ(i,j) + q′(p)|p=ρ(i,j)(ρ(i, j)− c(i))]
∂ρ(i, j)
∂i
+
θ
∂ρ(i,j)
∂j
∂φi
∂j
r + δ − θ ∂φi
∂i
 . (12)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Next, by considering the yardstick pricing rule ρ(i, j) , c(j) (i.e., the Shleifer’s rule
(10), when N = 2), the PDE (12) becomes:
∂φi
∂i
(−δi + θφi) + ∂φi
∂j
(−δj + θφj) =
= (r+δ)φi+
θ
γ
c′(i)q(p)|p=c(j)−
θ2[q(p)|p=c(j) + q′(p)|p=c(j)(c(j)− c(i))]c′(j)∂φj∂i
γ[r + δ − θ ∂φj
∂j
]
. (13)
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On the contrary, from (9) we get that the feedback representation of the OLNE strategy,
when the same pricing rule is adopted, which we denote by ψi(i, j), solves the following
PDE:
∂ψi
∂i
(−δi + θψi) + ∂ψi
∂j
(−δj + θψj) = (r + δ)ψi + θ
γ
c′(i)q(p)|p=c(j). (14)
Notice that equation (13) is identical to equation (14) up to the third summand in the
right-hand side, which is different from zero also when i = j.
8 Therefore, any solution
of the PDE (13) does not coincide with the solution of equation (14), even restricted to
i = j. Since, as we have seen, in the case with the same initial efficiency levels for both
firms, the OLNE yields the first-best equilibrium trajectories when the Shleifer’s pricing
rule is adopted, we can conclude that condition (i) of Definition 1 is not fulfilled in any
MPNE. We can thus state the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. The Shleifer’s pricing rule is not able to achieve the first-best solution
along the equilibrium path of any MPNE.
It is worth exploring in more details how the Shleifer’s pricing rule shapes the behavior
of firms under the state-feedback information structure. To this end, notice that if we
solve for the MPNE by using the dynamic programming approach, we would have:
φi(i, j) =
θ
γ
∂Vi(i, j)
∂i
,
where Vi is player i’s (unknown) value function.
9 Therefore,
∂φi
∂j
=
θ
γ
∂2Vi
∂j∂i
,
∂φi
∂i
=
θ
γ
∂2Vi
∂2i
.
The second-order condition of the firm’s maximization problem requires the value function
to be concave, entailing
∂2Vi
∂2i
< 0,
∂2Vi
∂2j
< 0.
8Since, clearly, given the strategic interdependences between the players, the function
∂φj
∂ei
= ∂φi∂ej is
not identically zero (more below).
9This result follows from the first-order condition of firm i’s maximization problem (see equation (C.1)
in Appendix C), since, as it is well known, the co-state variable associated with a state variable coincides
with the derivative of the value function with respect to the considered state variable.
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Thus, we can conclude
∂φi
∂i
=
∂φj
∂j
< 0.
Moreover, under the Shleifer’s pricing rule, it should be the case that
∂φj
∂i
=
∂φi
∂j
=
θ
γ
∂2Vi
∂j∂i
> 0.
The motivation (and the economic intuition) for this claim is as follows: for every regulated
firm, the more efficient are rivals, the lower the regulated price, and the larger the sold
quantity; consequently, also the marginal benefit from investments aimed at achieving a
further cost decrease has to be expected to be larger — i.e., ∂
∂j
(
∂Vi
∂i
)
= ∂φi
∂j
> 0.
Thus, by regulating prices according to a yardstick competition mechanism, the regula-
tor is able to lead a provider to invest more in response to an increase in its rival’s efficiency.
Put it another way, such pricing scheme entails an intertemporal strategic complementar-
ity (Jun and Vives, 2004), which may at least alleviate the under-investment problem we
identified in the unregulated monopoly case.10 Intuitively, even over-investment could be
expected under the closed-loop solution, as compared to the open-loop one, because in
any instant of time, under the closed-loop solution, firms are led to react to the lower pro-
duction cost of rivals, increasing further their investment effort, given that the marginal
benefit from cost reduction are larger, the larger is the volume of production.11 Such a
punctual reaction is absent under the open-loop solution, where firms commit themselves
to the investment plan designed at the beginning of the interaction.
10Notice that this reasoning applies not only to the Shleifer’s rule, but to any other pricing rule such
that the regulated price for a firm is a decreasing function of the cost of its competitor. We also expect
a similar mechanism to apply in the more general case with N firms.
11Indeed, from ∂φi∂i =
∂φj
∂j
< 0, ∂φi∂j > 0 and
∂φj
∂i
> 0, we have
θ2q(p)|p=c(j)c′(j)
∂φj
∂i
γ[r+δ−θ ∂φj∂j ]
> 0, implying that
the right-hand side of equation (13) is higher than the right-hand side of equation (14). Since the left-
hand side of equation (13) represents the time derivative of the investment along the equilibrium path,
we have just argued that its value in any MPNE is higher compared to the OLNE, the latter coinciding
with the first-best solution. Nevertheless, this does not suffice to prove that the yardstick pricing rule
leads providers to invest more, as compared to the first-best solution, since we are not able to determine
the values of investments at the initial time in the two equilibria.
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In any case, the true strategic interaction among the firms over time, entailed by
the state-feedback information structure, as compared with the game with the open-loop
information structure, leads the yardstick pricing rule to be ineffective in replicating the
first-best outcome in a dynamic environment. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that only
one policy instrument is controlled by the regulator (the regulated price based on the
opponent(s)’ cost), while the choice variables under the control of the regulated firms,
and the state variables affecting them, are in a larger number.
To conclude, a substantial reason why individually optimal investment path of firms
that compete over time under closed-loop behaviour rule differs from the social first-best
path rests on the extent of the dynamic complementarity between investments of different
firms (the optimal investment of a firm increases, if the rival’s investment increases). This
has nothing to do with different reasons, analysed by available contributions, that could
prevent the yardstick regulation to be effective, such as collusive behaviour (see, e.g.,
Tangeras, 2002, and Potters et al., 2004) or biased incentives (see Dalen, 1998).
7. Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have shown that the simple yardstick pricing rule suggested by
Shleifer in his seminal contribution dated 1985 is able to lead to the first-best solution in
a dynamic framework, only if regulated firms compete by adopting open-loop behaviour
rules and they are symmetric at the initial instant of time. In the presence of asymmetry
among firms, the social efficiency can be reached by firms following open-loop rules only
in the asymptotic steady state. We have also shown that the simple yardstick competition
mechanism is not able to drive to socially efficient outcome, if regulated firms adopt state-
feedback behaviour rules. This is due to the fact that firms are led to react, instant by
instant, to the investment choices of rivals, and they can set a larger number of control
variables, whereas only one policy instrument is used in the yardstick regulation.
For sure, the aim of the present paper is very focussed, and the model is specific and
overlooks several features of the real world, including product innovation. For instance,
in our model, monopoly unambiguously entails dynamic inefficiency, beyond the usual
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static deadweight loss, and no room is present for dynamically efficient phenomena a`
la Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1934). Though very simple, our model has shown that the
properties of price regulation in a dynamic framework, and more specifically in differential
games, crucially depend on the behaviour rules followed by regulated subjects, that is,
the information set they use when making their choices. One can interpret as a “positive”
result the finding that yardstick price regulation is able to lead firms to replicate the
social first-best, provided that the regulated subjects use open-loop behaviour rules. The
“negative” outcome is that such a regulatory mechanism based on one price and Markovian
rules is not able to replicate the social first-best if regulated subjects follow closed-loop
behaviour rules.
Based on these findings, a comprehensive study of more general mechanisms of price
regulation, in dynamic settings with regulated firms competing in the same market (see,
e.g., Brekke et al., 2012, and Siciliani et al., 2013), again under different behaviour rules
of players, is in our future research agenda.
References
[1] Akao, K. I. (2008). Tax schemes in a class of differential games. Economic Theory,
35, 155-174.
[2] Armstrong, M. & R. H. Porter (2007). Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume
3. North Holland, Amserdam.
[3] Bas¸ar, T., A. Haurie, & G. Zaccour (2018). Nonzero-Sum Differential Games. In:
Bas¸ar, T., & Zaccour, G. (Eds.), Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, 61-110.
[4] Bas¸ar, T., & G.J. Olsder (1999, 2nd ed). Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory,
SIAM, New York.
[5] Benchekroun, H., & N. Van Long (1998). Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting
oligopolists. Journal of Public Economics, 70, 325-342.
21
[6] Bisceglia, M. (2019). Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game. Journal
of Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-019-00662-y.
[7] Bisceglia, M., Cellini, R., & Grilli, L. (2019). Quality competition in healthcare
services with regional regulators: A differential game approach. Dynamic Games and
Applications, 9(1), 1-23.
[8] Brekke, K. R., Cellini, R., Siciliani, L., & Straume, O. R. (2012). Competition in
regulated markets with sluggish beliefs about quality. Journal of Economics & Man-
agement Strategy, 21, 131-178.
[9] Cellini, R., Siciliani, L., & Straume, O. R. (2018). A dynamic model of quality
competition with endogenous prices. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
94, 190-206.
[10] Dalen, D.M. (1998). Yardstick competition and investment incentives. Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy, 7, 105-126.
[11] Dockner, E. J., Jorgensen, S., Van Long, N., & Sorger, G. (2000). Differential
games in economics and management science. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge (UK).
[12] Faure-Grimaud, A. & Reiche, S. (2006). Dynamic yardstick mechanisms. Games and
Economic Behavior, 54, 316-35.
[13] Jun, B., & Vives, X. (2004). Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly. Journal of
Economic Theory, 116, 249-281.
[14] Karp, L., & Livernois, J. (1992). On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable
resource monopolist. Journal of Public Economics, 49(2), 219-239.
[15] Meran, G. & C. von Hirshhausen (2009). A modified yardstick competition mecha-
nism. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 35, 223-245
22
[16] Meya, J. (2015). Dynamics of yardstick regulation: Historical cost data and the
ratchet effect. CEGE discussion paper 244/2015.
[17] Menezes, F. M., & Pereira, J. (2017). Emissions abatement R&D: Dynamic compe-
tition in supply schedules. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 19, 841-859.
[18] Potters, J., Rockenbach, B., Sadrieh, A., & van Damme, E. (2004). Collusion under
yardstick competition: An experimental study. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 22, 1017-1038.
[19] Shleifer, A. (1985). A Theory of Yardstick Competition. The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 16, 319-327.
[20] Schmalensee, R. & Willig, R. (1989). Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 2.
North Holland, Amsterdam.
[21] Schumpeter, J. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Prof-
its, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge (US).
[22] Siciliani, L., Straume, O.R. & Cellini, R. (2013). Quality competition with motivated
providers and sluggish demand. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 37,
2041-2061.
[23] Tangeras, T.P. (2002). Collusion proof yardstick competition. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 83, 231-254.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
The (current-value) Hamiltonian function for the optimal control problem of the
benevolent planner is
H(p, I, , µ) =
∫ ∞
p
q(x) dx+ [p− c()]q(p)− γ
2
I2 + µ(−δ+ θI),
where µ is the (current-value) co-state variable.
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The first-order conditions (henceforth, FOCs) with respect to p and I give, respec-
tively,
H
∂p
= [p− c()]q′(p) = 0 ⇐⇒ p = c(),
H
∂I
= −γI + θµ = 0 ⇐⇒ µ = γ
θ
I.
The adjoint equation is
µ˙ = (r + δ)µ+ c′()q(p).
From the FOCs, by means of easy calculations, we get the first equation of system
(2), which an optimal control must satisfy, together with the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
e−rtµ = 0.
The above conditions are sufficient for an optimal control problem if the Hamiltonian
is jointly concave with respect to the controls and the state variables. To this end, a
sufficient condition is that its Hessian matrix is negative definite. The Hessian matrix is
given by:
∇2H ,

∂H2
∂p2
∂H2
∂p∂I
∂H2
∂p∂
∂H2
∂I∂p
∂H2
∂I2
∂H2
∂I∂
∂H2
∂∂p
∂H2
∂∂I
∂H2
∂2
 =

q′(p) + [p− c()]q′′(p) 0 −c′()q′(p)
0 −γ 0
−c′()q′(p) 0 −c′′()q(p)
 (A.1)
This matrix is negative definite if all the coefficients of its characteristic polynomial are
positive. This amounts to impose:
γ − [q′(p) + [p− c()]q′′(p)] + c′′()q(p) > 0
−γ[q′(p) + [p− c()]q′′(p)− c′′()q(p)] > [c′()q′]2 + [q′(p) + [p− c()]q′′(p)][c′′()q(p)]
γ{[c′()q′]2 + [q′(p) + [p− c()]q′′(p)][c′′()q(p)]} < 0
(A.2)
The first inequality of system (A.2) is satisfied for
q′(p) + [p− c()]q′′(p) < 0, (A.3)
which is satisfied under Assumption (A). Moreover, from (A.3) it follows that the third in-
equality of system (A.2) implies the second one and it is verified if and only if Assumption
(A) holds.
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We now turn to the steady state analysis. Given the smoothness properties of the
considered functions, a sufficient condition in order for equation (3) to admit a unique
(positive) solution is that: (i) lim
→0
−q(p)|p=c()c′() > 0; (ii) lim
→∞
−q(p)|p=c()c′() = 0; (iii)
−q(p)|p=c()c′() is decreasing over  ∈ (0,∞).
As for condition (i), by using de l’Hopital theorem, under our requirements on the
demand and the cost function,
lim
→0
q(p)|p=c()c′() = lim
→0
−q′(p)|p=c() [c
′()]3
c′′()
< 0.
Condition (ii) is trivially satisfied since lim
→∞
q(p)|p=c()c′() = q(p)|p=c · 0.
Lastly, we compute
∂[q(p)|p=c()c′()]
∂
= q′(p)|p=c()[c′()]2 + q(p)|p=c()c′′(),
which turns out to be positive under Assumption (A), thus establishing condition (iii).
Finally, we turn to the stability analysis of the equilibrium. The Jacobian matrix of
system (2) is given by:
J ,
 ∂˙∂ ∂˙∂I
∂I˙
∂
∂I˙
∂I
 =
 −δ θ
θ
γ
[q′(p)|p=c()[c′]2 + q(p)|p=c()c′′()] r + δ

Since tr(J) = δ > 0 and, under Assumption (A),
det(J) = −δ(r + δ)− θ
2
γ
[q′(p)|p=c()[c′]2 + q(p)|p=c()c′′()] < 0,
it follows that the equilibrium is a saddle point.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
The (current-value) Hamiltonian function for the optimal control problem of the un-
regulated firm is
H(p, I, , µ) = [p− c()]q(p)− γ
2
I2 + µ(−δ+ θI),
where µ is the (current-value) co-state variable.
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The FOCs with respect to price and investment yield, respectively,
q(p) + [p− c()]q′(p) = 0,
µ =
γ
θ
I.
The adjoint equation is
µ˙ = (r + δ)µ+ c′()q(p).
By combining the last two equations, we get the first equation of system (5), which an
optimal control must satisfy, together with the transversality condition lim
t→∞
e−rt(t) = 0.
The sufficient conditions for an optimal control are satisfied if the Hamiltonian is
jointly concave with respect to the controls and the state variables. To this end, a sufficient
condition is that its Hessian matrix is negative definite. The Hessian matrix is given by:
∇2H ,

∂H2
∂p2
∂H2
∂p∂I
∂H2
∂p∂
∂H2
∂I∂p
∂H2
∂I2
∂H2
∂I∂
∂H2
∂∂p
∂H2
∂∂I
∂H2
∂2
 =

2q′(p) + [p− c()]q′′(p) 0 −c′()q′(p)
0 −γ 0
−c′()q′(p) 0 −c′′()q(p)

which is identical to the Hessian matrix (A.1), with the exception of the (1, 1)-element.
Thus, it is trivial to see that, under our Assumption (A), the considered matrix is negative
definite.
As for the steady state analysis, given the smoothness properties of the considered func-
tions, a sufficient condition in order for equation (6) to admit a unique (positive) solution
is that: (i) lim
→0
−q(p)|p=h()c′() > 0; (ii) lim
→∞
−q(p)|p=h()c′() = 0; (iii) −q(p)|p=h()c′() is
decreasing over  ∈ (0,∞).
By proceeding like in Appendix 1, it is easy to see that conditions (i) and (ii) are
satisfied. As for condition (iii), we have
∂[−q(p)|p=h()c′()]
∂
= −[q′(p)|p=h()h′()c′() + q(p)|p=h()c′′()].
By substituting the expression for h′() obtained from the implicit function theorem —
i.e.,
h′() =
c′()q′(p)
2q′(p) + [p− c()]q′′(p) ,
26
it is clear that condition (iii) is satisfied under Assumption (A).
As for the stability of the equilibrium point, the Jacobian matrix of system (5), taking
into account that p is fixed according to equation (4), which defines the implicit function
p = h(), is given by:
J ,
 ∂˙∂ ∂˙∂I
∂I˙
∂
∂I˙
∂I
 =
 −δ θ
θ
γ
[q′(p)|p=h()h′()c′() + q(p)|p=c()c′′()] r + δ

Since tr(J) = δ > 0 and det(J) = −δ(r+ δ)− θ2
γ
[q′(p)|p=h()h′()c′() + q(p)|p=c()c′′()], it
follows that the equilibrium is a saddle point if
q(p)|p=h(¯)c′′(¯) + q′(p)|p=h(¯)h′()c′() > −γδ(r + δ)
θ2
,
which is satisfied under Assumption (A).
Finally, from h() > c(), it immediately follows that ¯ < ∗.
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 2
In order to find an OLNE of the differential game, we apply the Pontryagin maximum
principle. The (current-value) Hamiltonian function of firm i, i = 1, . . . , N, is
Hi(I, , µi) = [ρi()− c(i)]q(p)|p=ρi() −
γ
2
I2i + µi(−δ+ θI),
where µi , (µi,1, . . . , µi,N) is the vector of co-state variables for player i.
The FOC with respect to Ii yields
∂Hi
∂Ii
= 0 ⇐⇒ µi,i = γ
θ
Ii, (C.1)
whereas the adjoint equations are
µ˙i,i = (r + δ)µi,i − ∂ρi∂i [q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))] + c′(i)q(p)|p=ρi()
µ˙i,j = (r + δ)µi,j − ∂ρi∂j [q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))], j = 1, . . . , N, j 6= i
which a candidate equilibrium must satisfy, together with the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
e−rtµi,ii = 0, i = 1, . . . , N .
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From the first adjoint equation and the FOC on Ii we get the first equation of system
(8), whereas the other adjoint equations do not play any role in the solution of our
problem.
Lastly, in order to obtain the feedback representation of the OLNE strategies, Ii =
ψi(), we compute
I˙i =
〈
∂ψi
∂
,−δ+ θψi()
〉
, (C.2)
and substitute these expressions into the first equation of system (8).
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 3
Consider firm i’s problem, given that the other players j = 1, . . . , N, j 6= i, adopt a
Markovian strategy Ij = φj().
Let φ−i denote the vector whose components are the equilibrium strategies of firm
i’s rivals — i.e., φ−i , (φ1(), . . . , φi−1(), φi+1(), . . . , φN()). Then, the (current-value)
Hamiltonian function for player i is
Hi(Ii, , µi, φ−i) = [ρi()−c(i)]q(p)|p=ρi()−
γ
2
I2i +µi,i(−δi+θIi)+
〈
µi,−i,−δ−i+θφ−i
〉
,
where µi,−i , (µi,1, . . . , µi,i−1, µi,i+1, . . . µi,N) is the vector of co-state variables of player i
associated with the state variables of the other players.
The FOC with respect to Ii is again given by (C.1), but now the adjoint equations are
µ˙i,i = (r + δ)µi,i − ∂ρi∂i [q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))] + c′(i)q(p)|p=ρi() − θ
〈
µi,−i,
∂φ−i
∂i
〉
µ˙i,j = (r + δ)µi,j − θ
〈
µi,−i,
∂φ−i
∂j
〉
− ∂ρi
∂j
[q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))], ∀j 6= i
(D.1)
which must be satisfied together with the transversality conditions lim
t→∞
e−rtµi,ii = 0, i =
1, . . . , N . In order to look for a MPNE, we should first compute the constant (i.e., time-
invariant) solution of the ODE system in the unknown functions µi,j, then substitute it
into the ODE for µi,i. Then, consider the closed-loop strategy for player i, φi(). From
the FOC (C.1) we obtain
µ˙i,i =
γ
θ
〈
∂φi
∂
,−δ+ θφi()
〉
. (D.2)
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By equating the right-hand sides of the two ODEs in µ˙i,i (i.e., (D.2) and the first ODE of
system (D.1)), we can find the PDE that must be satisfied by firm i’is MPNE strategy.
Thus, to find a MPNE for a given pricing rule ρ(), we must carry out these calculations
for each player.
To obtain analytical expressions, we consider the simplest case with N = 2 firms. In
this case, for player i, system (D.1) becomes:
µ˙i,i = (r + δ)µi,i − ∂ρi∂i [q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))] + c′(i)q(p)|p=ρi() − θµi,j
∂φj
∂i
µ˙i,j = (r + δ − θµi,j ∂φj∂j )µi,j −
∂ρi
∂j
[q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))], j 6= i
The constant solution for µi,j is given by:
µi,j =
∂ρi
∂j
[q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))]
r + δ − θ ∂φj
∂j
.
From the FOC (C.1), we obtain the following PDE system:
∂φi
∂i
(−δi + θφi) + ∂φi
∂j
(−δj + θφj) = (r + δ)φi + θ
γ
c′(i)q(p)|p=ρi()+
− θ
γ
[q(p)|p=ρi() + q′(p)|p=ρi()(ρi()− c(i))]
(
∂ρi
∂i
+
θ ∂ρi
∂j
∂φj
∂i
r + δ − θ ∂φj
∂j
)
(D.3)
Consider a non-discriminatory pricing rule such that ρi(i, j) = ρj(j, i), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
If this is the case, then we can find a symmetric MPNE, given by a pair of Markovian
strategies (φ1(1, 2), φ2(1, 2)) such that ∀1, 2 : φ1(1, 2) = φ2(2, 1) — i.e. ∂φj∂i =
∂φi
∂j
and
∂φj
∂j
= ∂φi
∂i
. After substituting these expressions into (D.3), we finally get equation
(12) that a symmetric MPNE strategy must solve, together with an unspecified boundary
condition ensuring the convergence towards a steady state.
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